

A
LETTER
TO THE
AUTHOR OF A PAMPHLET
ENTITLED
CONSIDERATIONS

Upon the DIFFERENT MODES of finding
RECRUITS for the ARMY.

WITH A
SHORT ADDRESS
TO
The King's Servants.

L O N D O N:
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Sir,

I Have no right, nor indeed have I the least inclination, to enquire into the views, with which you may have entered into the Question, which is the subject of your Pamphlet.

It is as little to my purpose, who you are, or what you are. You may be an Irish Roman-Catholic, eager to fight, as a Recruiting Officer calls it, in the cause of your *Creator*.

You may be some English Boy, in love with a Red Coat, desirous of stepping over the heads of Veterans covered with scars and barren laurels. Or, you may be some Highland Chieftain, desirous of preserving your authority over your Clan by distributing military rank and emoluments among your

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Neighbours ; and by that means keeping them in a situation of subjection and dependence, from whence the wise Laws of Lord Hardwicke were intended to have extricated that part of the Country.

Some phrases in your pamphlet would lead me to rank you under the last denomination. But it is not worth any man's while to consider *who* either You or I are, but what attention our Arguments deserve.

I shall, as well as I can, consider your *Reasons* in the order you have ranged them.

Your first reason for preferring New Corps to the augmentation of Old ones goes upon this ground :

“ That all, or almost all, the Old
 “ Regiments of Infantry are now, or
 “ will be soon, in America, *Africa*, or
 “ *Asia*.” (*Melancholy news!*) But
 “ the Common People of Britain or
 “ Ireland, who are beyond all nations
 “ attached to their own Country, will
 “ be mighty shy of enlisting, when, in
 , answer

“ answer to the very first question which
 “ they put, to wit, Where the Regi-
 “ ment is ? they shall be told, they
 “ must sail many thousand miles,” &c.

I should flatter myself, that this is a little overstated with regard to the distribution of the Old Regiments. A pretty considerable number are now upon the estimate of Guards and Garrisons. *Africa* and *Asia*, to be sure, were introduced by you as an *Anti-recruiting Serjeant*; for in the first there are only *three Companies*, and in the latter not a *single Man* of the Regular Troops of Great Britain. But, pray, what are to become of these Old Corps ? Are they to remain mere skeletons ? Is the Public to pay Regiments of Officers without Men ? Or are these Old Officers to be disbanded, to make room for the New ones, of which you give so tempting a description ? You say, Recruits will ask, “ *Where is the Regiment ?* ” May they not ask, *Where am I to be sent ?* Are their *Officers* to

keep them in a *happy Ignorance* on that subject, and then force them abroad?

In your 15th page you say, " A single Mutiny in an English Army in America might risk the English Empire there." What cause is more likely to raise a Mutiny, than the sending Men to America, from whom it was studiously concealed, that they were raised for that service? Two Regiments in the last war were forced on board of ship, after having been promised they should not go out of England. Ask the Officers who served at Gibraltar, what was the condition and temper of those ill-treated Corps during the rest of the War. I agree with you in your *second Reason*, that Officers of New Corps will have a greater incitement to raise Men, because their Rank depends upon it. But will they not then outbid the Old Corps, and prevent them from being completed? I must then repeat my question, Do you mean, that the Old Corps should be disbanded, or

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the Public saddled with the expence of Officers without Men ?

Your Third Reason begins with these words : " The only Men who will " ask the command of the New Corps, " or at least who will get them, will " be men of great Estates and Family, " or, at least, of great Popularity ; be- " cause these are the only Men, who " can raise New Corps."

What happened at the latter end of the last war gives a flat contradiction to this assertion ; for among the numerous New Corps, that were levied at that time, I believe not Three of them were commanded by Officers who had any of those circumstances in their favour. They were, in general, given to Soldiers of Fortune. I remember in particular, that a Corps called the *London Volunteers* was commanded by a Gentleman of the name of Nairne. Now I am much disposed to think, that the *Military Merit and Services* of that Gentleman recommended him to the Secretary at War for promotion ; and

and not the particular weight and importance of *his Name, Family, Fortune, or Popularity* in this Metropolis.

“ The Commandants (you say) will
“ chuse Officers under them from such
“ Officers of the Army, as are of the
“ best Estates and Family.” To this I
have the greatest objection.

I have no idea of so bad an Army, as one composed of Corps commanded by Gentlemen raised to their Rank, not for Military merit, but on account of their Estates and Families; especially when these Commandants are likewise to have the choice of Officers under them.

I dislike the measure, on account of the mortification and hardship it imposes on the Officers of the Veteran Corps now employed on the most disagreeable of services. And yet, Sir, I profess myself to be an admirer “ neither of *Cromwell, nor Cæsar*. The “ Interest of no Body of Men ought “ to be opposed to that of the State:” But it must be a very evident and important

portant advantage to the State, that can even palliate the evident cruelty and injustice of such treatment of men under such circumstances.

When you apply this to the Irish Roman-Catholics and the Highlanders, my objections are increased. I know of nothing so immediately dangerous to every part of the Kingdom, as the forming the first of these into separate Corps. They are, by the severity of the present Irish Laws, made undoubtedly enemies to our present Constitution: perhaps they may have been lately taught to believe, that they might have a better chance of favor from the Crown, if it was less limited in its power, than under the present form of government. I have heard that the Irish Roman-Catholics, even in the Counties where the *power of the White-boys is the most predominant*, profess to be friends to the Crown, though enemies to the British and Irish Parliaments. Under these circumstances of irritation, I am therefore not in the least

least inclined to begin relaxation by such a step, as putting arms into their hands, and forming them into separate Corps.

As to the Highlanders, I am much disposed to acquit them of the imputation of *Jacobitism*; but I am not equally inclined to endeavour to effect their return to *Clanship*. Who ever has read the History of Scotland, must have observed the many disorders and convulsions, to which that Country was subject, in former periods, from the power of the Highland Chieftains over their Vassals. Depredation, robbery, and violence of every kind, were reckoned acts of gallantry in their state of vassalage and barbarism. If I am not mistaken, Dr. Robertson states the Earls of Huntly, Atholl, and Argyll, at the head of their dependents, as more than a match for the power of the King of Scotland. To a state in any degree similar to this, I do not wish them to return.

As

As to the Corps to which you allude, when you mention the great dispatch with which they were raised, I have an Observation or two to make on them.

It would be contemptible to the last degree, as well as ungenerous and dishonourable, if I were to allude to the errors of a very early period of Gen. Fraser's life, for any other purpose than that of argument. Whatever demerit there may have been in the conduct (I had almost said) of his childhood, the behaviour of his maturer years, his Public Services and his Private Virtues, have totally effaced in the mind of every ingenuous man. I shall therefore without scruple argue, that the gratitude, with which he was impressed by the favour and confidence shewn him by his late Majesty, would naturally impel him to use more than common activity to convince the world of his zeal for the cause, in which he was engaged: at the same time he would, in all probability, be equally instigated by a laudable ambition to attain to a much-

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desired Rank in the Military service of his Country. His Tenants and Dependents were probably actuated by the same motives : they were likewise, *on that occasion*, to be commanded and led to action by Mr. Fraser himself.

This will account for the quick completion of that Corps. They succeeded, and did their Commandant and themselves equal honour, and were of much service to their Country. But, though I profess to have as high a sense of the services of Gen. Fraser and his Corps, as any man ; though I saw with pleasure a beneficent and discerning Parliament make the restoration of the Estate forfeited by his Family the reward of his Services ; yet I am ready to say, that I do not approve of annexing an Hereditary Command of Two Thousand Highlanders to the Estate of Lovatt.

The Earl of Sutherland might, for any thing I know, complete his Corps in two weeks : but you will please to recollect, Sir, that there was a condition annexed to the enlisting of the Sutherlands ;

therlands; which surely will not be of much service at present, and is never, in my opinion, to be imitated; *they were not to quit Great Britain.* In fact, they never did quit Scotland.

“ All the Drummers, and Serjeants, “ and Pipers, in the Army, could not “ have raised Three Thousand Men in “ Three Years, if they had been in- “ tended for Thirty additional Com- “ panies for Thirty different Regi- “ ments.”

I can only say, in answer to that, that more men have been raised for that purpose in that manner in a very short time. At present, I suspect that there has been an artificial restraint upon both Highlanders and Irish, in order to make the scheme you propose *necessary*. If the Government suffer themselves to be treated in that manner, they will put themselves for ever in the power of those, who have on this occasion acted disingenuously by them.

Your Fourth Reason is, that “ ad- “ ditional Corps are cheaper to the “ Nation than additional Companies.”

You

You appeal to Figures. It is not unpleasant to see how an ingenious Advocate can make even *Figures, stubborn as they are pretended to be, bend* to his purpose. You state the additional Companies at a Captain, a Lieutenant, an Ensign, and Sixty Private: your *intended Corps* (and, give me leave to say, I shrewdly suspect you have some such Corps in embryo) at One Lieutenant-Colonel, Two Majors, Seven Captains, Twenty Lieutenants, Ten Ensigns, One Thousand Private.

Pray, Sir, by what Military rule do you judge, that the Companies in a New Corps may consist of One Hundred Men, and that those in an Old one cannot exceed Sixty? In the two last wars the Companies in the marching Regiments were at One Hundred; and I cannot see why they may not be in time augmented to the same number on this occasion.

In short, Sir, you take the additional Companies at their present period; and you, *ad libitum*, form your Corps in

in such a manner as shall appear less expensive.

Look to the numerous Corps raised at the latter end of the last war, and see if they did not distress the Recruiting Service, discourage the Old meritorious Officer, introduce improper men into the service, and lay a heavy load of Half-pay upon the Public.

You then propose to take Half-pay Officers for your New Corps. For God's sake, why are they supposed to be *more opulent, higher born, or more popular*, (the chief arguments you use for your New Corps) when enrolled in new Corps than old? What will these *Commandants* say to this restriction, who, at the beginning of your pamphlet, were to be enabled to raise their Corps by having the choice of their own Officers left to them?

I have read *Reason* the Sixth, and *Reason* the Seventh, six or seven times over; and I beg your pardon for saying it, I find in them abundance of entertaining History, a torrent of Erudition, but, in

in my poor opinion, nothing like a Reason.

“ The French may” (though I do not believe they do) “ compose their Regiments of the inhabitants of different provinces in separate Regiments. Armies of Highlanders may be bands of different Families, obedient to one Head.”

Yet the British Armies, *ill composed* as our Corps have *ever* been in your opinion, have been generally found a match for either of them, and sometimes for both together.

“ Francis the First had ninety of his Scotch guard killed round him.—“ Charles the First received every careless fellow into his Troops.—Cromwell judged wiser; he took none but those, over whose minds he had a hold.”

“ Cæsar’s Cohorts, when taken prisoners, put themselves to death.—“ Otho’s Soldiers stabbed themselves round his funeral pile.”

“ These

“ These matters may, as you say, deserve very *serious* reflections.” But pray, Sir, were they *additional Companies*, or *additional Corps*? For, if you cannot answer me that question, they deserve in my opinion no consideration at all in the present dispute.

Reason the last, like the former two, is in my opinion much more like *Rhapsody* than *Reason*. You conclude it by saying, “ the success of General Fraser’s Recruiting will in a short time convince the Public, that the writer of this paper is excusable for laying down his opinions with a degree of authority, which perhaps does not become a private person.”

I really do not mean to blame the *manner* in which you lay down your opinions; but give me leave to say, that whatever success General Fraser may have in Recruiting, it does not follow, that every Adventurer, who may offer to raise a Corps, will be able to accomplish his scheme, or ought to be attended to. General Fraser undoubtedly has advantages

tages that do not belong to every Highlander, or Irish Roman-Catholic. However, at present, the success even of Gen. Fraser's levies is not determined ; and there is strong reason to believe, that, had not the levy of such a Corps been expected, many of the Men, who will list by preference in his Regiment, would have offered themselves to the Old Corps. As far as that goes, therefore, the Public gains certainly nothing by the levy of the New Corps.

I have now gone through your Reasons. You have stated Four Objections to your plan, and, in my opinion, have by no means answered them.

Nay, Sir, in your answer to the first objection, you mention a fact, which seems to me too strong for all your arguments in favour of your scheme, and leads to a conclusion directly against it. I mean, that “ King William's first “ Campaign in Ireland was unsuccessful, because he was obliged to appoint “ the new Officers of the new Regiments “ from among the Sons and Brothers of “ his

“ his Subjects of Condition, whom he wished
“ by that means to attach to his cause,
“ and who had never been in the Army
“ before.” Look back to your fourth
and fifth pages, and see whether the
Officers, whom you propose to put at
the head of these New Corps, do not
bear a description very similar to those,
to whose inexperience you attribute the
ill success of King William’s first Cam-
paign. In the Veteran Officers, with
whom *that great Prince* replaced these
inexperienced Young Men of Family, Estate,
and Popularity, I see a strong resemblance
of those unfortunate meritorious Old
Officers, who are like to be sacrificed
at the shrine of Interest and Court-
favour, if the scheme of *New Corps*
should take place.

Elliott's Dragoons are quoted as an instance of New Corps behaving with unparalleled intrepidity. I am afraid no consequence can be drawn from the behaviour of that gallant Corps at Emsdorff, upon which any Military principle can be founded. They did, on

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that occasion, what perhaps no Corps of Light Cavalry, young or old, ever did before, or will do again: But it is certain, that no Corps are so soon trained for action as Light Cavalry: it is a service, to which all Nations (but this in particular) have a natural inclination.

But let it be remembered, that Elliott's was not raised till every Corps of Cavalry in the kingdom was at the highest establishment ever known. Such was then the attention to Oeconomy in the management of our Levies. Then, Sir, it should be remembered, that the Officers were picked from the Cavalry, as Men peculiarly adapted to the Service; and this circumstance fully accounts for the extraordinary character of the Regiment.

As for the Highland Corps, I never heard that they did not do as well as others; I never heard them preferred to others. I am sure I never heard that the Old Royal Highland Corps was not as good as the *New-levied* Ones.

I am

I am no Army-Pedant, and I hate pedantry of all kinds ; but still I am of opinion, with all the Military Authors I ever read, *except yourself*, and with all the Military Men with whom I ever conversed, that New Corps can never be so fit for immediate service as Old ; That men take time to learn every thing ; That the learning to take care of themselves, their arms, and baggage, takes some time ; and that, for want of that knowledge, Young Troops are often obliged to quit the field, while Veterans remain in it : That Young Troops are always sickly at the first taking the field : In short, that there are a hundred little things, in which time and service alone can instruct both Officers and Men.

If any one would lay a scheme for the inevitable disgrace of our Arms in America, I am sure it could not be better accomplished than by composing the Army of these Young Corps.

For what then are they to be raised ?
For the *defending* of Great Britain and Ireland ?

Ireland? I shall hereafter take full notice of that head.

You deny, that these Corps are of detriment to the interests of the Old Officers. Let us see how you make out that point. "A Lieutenant Colonel Commandant indeed may get more than one step *in reward of his Public and Private Spirit*, and is well entitled to it: But a regulation might be made, and you believe *it was intended*, that none of the other Officers in the New Corps should get more than one step; and *that would leave the Rank of the Army undisturbed.*"

I think now you are plainly come to the *real drift* of your whole pamphlet, which I have from the beginning looked upon to be something like a *general plan* for a *particular purpose*. Your Officers have been, sometimes Young Men of Rank and Fortune; at other times, Veterans:—sometimes, were to be taken from Half-pay; and at other times, to be chosen, *ad libitum*, by the Com-

Commandants of the Corps. But now you seem to be ready to come into a composition: *A certain Lieutenant Colonel Commandant* is to be raised, perhaps from a Captain or Subaltern, or, not improbably, from no Rank in the Army at all; and then all the rest of the Officers may be tied down by whatever strict Military Rules of Promotion any body may please to impose on them: and this you believe *was intended.*

Pray, Sir, by whom?

You afterwards labour to prove to the poor Officers at Boston, that they are as much injured by an addition of Two Companies to the establishment of their *own* Corps, as by the raising New Corps officered by Gentlemen *now at home*. Those Officers cannot be in a laughing humour at present, and, let me tell you, will hardly relish a kind of reasoning, which no mortal can suppose to be serious.

In the first place, the Junior Officers of the Old Corps succeed to the Commissions

missions in these Companies, except here and there a Captain from the Half-pay, which they naturally expect. In the others they can expect no promotion, as the *presence of the Officer on the spot* is held out as one of the great recommendations of the New Corps, and as adding to the facility of Recruiting. After balancing the merit of *Recruiting* against that of *Fighting*, and the necessity of *Recruits* against that of *Arms*; you are at last driven to promise them *Brevets of Rank*, to preserve their superiority over the Officers of the New Corps. Pray, Sir, can you tell me, *was that intended too?* Because, if it was, it was *intended* to render the Army totally unserviceable.

If I understand this proposition, it is, that in case this *Young Friend* of yours should get his rank of Lieutenant Colonel from whatever rank he may now hold, all Officers, (at least in the Corps upon service) who shall now be his Seniors, are to be Brevet Lieutenant Colonels of a date anterior to his. In that

that Case *all* the Majors, and perhaps *half* or *all* the Captains in those Corps, will have the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; and, when his Corps comes to join them, they cannot serve as Captains. What a delightful facility this will give to the service! I should almost be ready to consent to give you your rank of Lieutenant Colonel, upon condition you would promise never to meddle with this subject again; for indeed, if this part of your scheme should have effect, you will totally ruin the Army.

The Americans will, I doubt not, be astonished at the effect of this scheme. And, now I mention the Americans, one thing naturally occurs to me. I have heard, during the whole course of this unfortunate Contest, that the Americans must be worsted, because their Troops are *new*, and ours are *Veterans*. Do you mean then to turn the tables upon them, and, in proportion as their Troops grow accustomed to the Field, to oppose them with new Levies commanded

manded by Young inexperienced Officers? Impossible! There must be some *other* purpose, for which these New *Corps* are intended.

Before I quite take my leave of this subject, I must say a word or two particularly upon the Additional Companies to the Old Regiments.

The plan of them, I have always understood, was first introduced in the beginning of the war before last. The Author is supposed to have been one of the most respectable Officers, that ever served this country in a Civil or Military capacity; one, for whose name and character I imagine you, Sir, must profess some respect. I mean the Earl of Stair. They were adopted afterwards by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. The considerations, which were supposed to have determined those *tolerably good Judges of Military matters* in favour of this scheme, were these.

In the first place, as they were to belong to Old Corps, those Corps would readily supply them with Non-commis-
sioned

sioned Officers, who were acquainted with each other, and would have the business of disciplining them much at heart. In the next place, by remaining at home, when the Regiments were in foreign service, they kept up a constant supply of Disciplined Men, to replace those which the Regiments to which they belonged might lose abroad. This has always been found a better supply, than Draughts from other Regiments; as by that method Men, who could have no predilection in favour of the Corps upon service, are collected from various Regiments, and make it almost a New Corps. Besides, it is notorious, that the Regiments who furnish the Draughts, generally take care to keep their best Men to themselves, and to send the worst to other Regiments.

Add to these another consideration, that it was a great comfort and relief to the Officers of Corps on Service, to be able sometimes to exchange to the Companies at home, when sickness, the fatigues of the campaign, or wounds,

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had made some temporary relief necessary.

Their places were immediately filled by Officers of the same Corps, and by that means the Regiments on service kept complete for action.

This principle is adopted in other services, but upon a larger scale. Several of the old Regiments of Infantry, both in the Austrian and French services, consist of Four Battalions each. It is usual for three of them to take the Field, while the fourth remains in Garrison, for the same purposes as the Two additional Companies of our Battalions did in the time I alluded to.

One more reason has been alledged in favour of these Companies; which is, that, being commanded by Old Officers at home, they are always ready, in case of any sudden emergency, to be formed into Battalions, if the domestic safety of the Country should require it. In the mean time they remain without the establishment of Field Officers, the Pay and Half-pay of which, you have not yet

yet convinced me, is not an additional burthen on this Country.

I have now, I believe, in a very irregular way, gone through your pamphlet. Your conclusion is a very singular one: "You never knew any pamphlet, but Mr. Mauduit's on the German War, have any considerable effect in England." And you seem to hope for an equal effect, or at least a proportionable one, from your own. I doubt it a little, as indeed our subject is not quite so striking, nor your title quite so interesting to the public, as Mr. Mauduit's.

Perhaps neither of our works will have so many readers as a pamphlet entitled *Observations on the present method of Shoeing Horses.*

I have at present done with *you* and *your* Scheme. I hope that I have not, in my treatment of your Arguments, said any thing that can be personally offensive to You. I have endeavoured to keep clear of any thing of that kind, and I hope I have succeeded.

But

But you say, in your third page, that you believe in your conscience, that " the *King's Servants* are open to conviction, when *Truth*, instead of abuse, " is *presented to them.*" I am glad to hear *You* say so; for I am much inclined to think *You* are well acquainted with the disposition of those Gentlemen, at least upon the subject on which we have been treating. I therefore, under your auspices, shall venture to address them, and mean to offer them nothing that does not seem to me founded in *Truth*; at least, I shall offer nothing that can be called *Abuse.*

To the King's Servants.

TO you then, Gentlemen, I presume to address myself, encouraged by an Author, who assures me you delight in *Truth*, as much as you justly despise and abhor abuse. I shall offer you arguments, that appear to me founded in *Truth*; and at least I promise you, I shall offer you nothing, that by a fair man can be termed *Abuse.*

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The subject, upon which I now treat, seems to me one of the most important ones, that ever was agitated; for it seems to me to be a decision of this material point, "*Into whose hands it is most proper to trust the Sword?*" That question is never so important, as when the word *Rebellion* is sounded loudly from one end of the British Dominion to the other. The opposing a Foreign Enemy may perhaps be safely trusted to any *able* hand; but the quelling an Insurrection of our Fellow Subjects, is a service upon which a more cautious examination is necessary. One part of our Fellow Citizens may be too ready to resent injuries, which do not press hard enough upon them to justify Resistance. At the same time there may be others, who may be still more culpably ready to lend their assistance to prevent all possibility of any Resistance of the most grievous injuries.

It is the business of every honest man to restrain the violence of the former,
and

and, I am sure, to keep all power out of the hands of the latter.

The Author of the Pamphlet, upon which I have ventured to make some observations, in my opinion labours hard to take the Arms out of the hands of those, who have hitherto served their Country with fidelity, with bravery, and with success : he seems to think, that in the present war other Men are fitter for the purpose. I shall to you, Gentlemen, venture to say what I think of this change of hands ; and then express my hope, that he is *mistaken* in his conjectures as to what *you intended*.

A Standing Army has been, in former times, the subject of the most interesting Debates, that ever passed in either House of Parliament. I flatter myself, that, though that (alas !) necessary evil is not likely to be removed, the principles, upon which it was formerly resisted, are not quite effaced out of the minds of Englishmen. Our Ancestors saw danger in an Army composed of men commissioned by the Crown,

Crown, appointed and displaceable by the same authority : but they saw some consolation in the appearance, that the Officers would be of two sorts ; either Men of Family and Fortune, who had an interest in the welfare of the Country ; or of Gentlemen, who by long and meritorious services had obtained a Character, which made them as responsible to their Country, as those who were their superiors in point of Fortune. These two sorts of Men *blended together* have hitherto commanded our Armies, and, thank God, with tolerable success.

Now, Gentlemen, I am extremely jealous of this New Plan, which gives an opportunity of introducing at once into the service a number of Corps commanded by *New Men*.

Irish Roman-Catholics, and Highlanders, are the materials of which these Corps are to be composed : for though, in order to throw a veil over the real scheme, *English Commoners* are, I think, *once* mentioned ; it is notorious,

rious, to the honour of this part of the Country, that no great Chieftain in *England* can lead his Vassals to war, whenever he has a point to carry.

I lament the present condition of the Roman-Catholics in Ireland, and should be pleased to see some mitigation of the Penal Laws against them. I should wish, that that mitigation should by degrees increase, till they were completely reconciled to the happy Constitution under which these Kingdoms have for some time flourished. But, in their present state of violent hostility to the Protestant interest, is it desirable to arm them as Corps, and give them that additional connexion, which would in all probability at once enable them to overpower the *unarmed, undisciplined* Protestants of that Country? Besides, what is with me an argument against them is, that it is notorious, that Roman-Catholics have a stronger propensity towards *Monarchy*, than is consistent with the Constitution of this mixed Government. Now, whatever indulgences

indulgences I may be inclined to grant to men of such *Political* as well as Religious principles, I should not begin by granting to them the power of the Sword. Yet to these there is an evident inclination in the Author upon whom I have observed ; and he professes to be not unacquainted with *your Intentions*.

I now proceed to consider the other source, from whence this additional strength is to be taken. I mean the Highlanders. The manner in which I think it necessary to treat this part of the subject, makes it a little delicate.

At the beginning of the present Reign great power and influence were lodged in the hands of a Nobleman of the Northern part of the Island. Whether he used that power wisely or unwisely, it is not my purpose at present to discuss. I do not mean to enquire into his virtues, or his failings. It unfortunately did so happen, that what was neither the one nor the other, I mean the *place of his Birth*, became the topic of much discussion. Those who were enemies

to his person and his measures, flattering popular prejudices, and (to use a vulgar phrase) *meaning to drive the nail that would go the farthest*, founded much objection to him on his being a *Scotchman*. Perhaps his partiality to a few of his Countrymen, and those not the most deserving of his favour, might serve to increase the popular clamour and discontent. However improper and absurd this conduct might be, it certainly had this unhappy effect, that it has much increased the antipathy, which has always subsisted between the lower orders of both parts of the United Kingdom. I wish the higher orders may be quite free from the contagion. A Writer of the Northern part of the Nation, who is much in vogue at present, blames some of the Stuarts for erecting castles with English garrisons in Scotland; whereas the Scotch, says he, were they properly encouraged, might be found inclined to curb the licentious spirits of the English. The *provocation* (for I fairly call it so) which the Scotch have received, may have

have rendered them fitter, for such a purpose, than I could wish, and, I hope, than you, Gentlemen, *intend*. I trust however it is not so. But I could wish to know what is the reason, that at present makes you, Gentlemen, so desirous of raising a *Scotch* Militia, of introducing into Great Britain the *Scotch* Brigade from Holland, and, finally, of raising a number of *Highland* Corps.

You have sent away the greatest part of the Veteran Corps from Great Britain and Ireland; you have completed them by Draughts from those which remain. Does any man in his senses believe, you mean to send these New Corps after them? No. They, whether composed of Roman Catholics or Highlanders, are to remain for the keeping of *Peace and good Order* in this Country. They will be commanded by Men, who owe their promotion to no Military Merit of their own, but to the *sole good pleasure* and *recent favour* of the Crown.

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Our Ancestors never saw, and, I am confident, would never have suffered, such an Army as this. Let me hope, that all their principles and reasoning on this subject are not intirely exploded; and that you will shew Yourselves not unworthy of your Ancestors, by resisting such applications.

Having treated this matter in a Constitutional light, I am almost ashamed to add any thing on Private or Professional ground. But, when I address myself to You, Gentlemen, I cannot pass over the *cruelty* and *injustice* of this scheme. What have the Officers of the Regiments in America merited at your hands? They have embarked (*as you say, without repining*) upon the most disagreeable service in the world: They have suffered more than I care to repeat: they have fought, they have formed a Phalanx round the gallant Howe; they have bled by his side; they have animated their Men by their example; they have forced the entrenchments of an obstinate persevering enemy. If they

they ask you, in the hour of their distress, for increase of Pay, or Half-pay; Oeconomy steps forward, and gives them a flat refusal. If they ask you for Promotion in their hour of service, you will have deprived yourselves of the power of gratifying their well-founded request, by a scheme, which is as opposite to every principle of Oeconomy, as it is to Wisdom, or to Justice.

I now take my leave of you, Gentlemen, as well as of the Author of the Considerations, &c. who seems much better acquainted with you than I am, and tells me, that you are very well *intentioned* Men. I should be glad that your *Intentions* were made a little clearer; and that, when known, they might convince me, that I am wrong in my conjectures. Whether wrong or right, I flatter myself, that I have offered you no *abuse*; I feel, that I have offered you reasoning founded in *Truth*.

I wish I was as sure of success in being believed, when I say, I disclaim National

tional Prejudice and National Reflection. In following my author, I have been obliged to mention names, which, as a Briton, I consider as Provincial, rather than National distinctions. I lament that those distinctions should have so much weight in the discussion into which I have entered. I bear no ill-will to any part of his Majesty's Dominions, nor to any class of his Subjects. I wish the Irish Roman Catholic much more comfort and ease in his domestic situation. I am satisfied that the Army should be open to every Scotch Officer and Soldier; and God forbid, that the name of Scotchman should stand in the way of the Merit of any man in any profession. I disclaim, with equal earnestness and sincerity, the being actuated, on this occasion, by Provincial prejudice, for which I have the utmost contempt. But still I profess, that the prospect of the face of this Country overspread with *new* Corps of Highlanders and Irish Roman-Catholics,

Catholics, the offspring of the Favour of the Day, shocks and alarms me. I can assign no *honest* reason for it; and am concerned to think, that to these the Constitution and the safety of this Country is to be committed, while the Corps, which are full of *old* Merit, *old* Names, and *old* Services, are at the distance of three thousand miles, pining and perishing by want, distress, ill usage, and mortification of every kind.

It is said, somewhere in the Pamphlet I allude to, that " the Prince " we serve is the Soldier's Friend, and " that the Minister of War feels for " the Old Officer."

As to the latter, if by *Minister of War* the Author means the *Secretary at War*, it is now no secret, that his *feelings* and *opinions* on this subject have been over-ruled by *you*, Gentlemen; and reason has been given to think, that they may be so again.

As to the former part of the sentence, respect and duty toward the Great Person

son alluded to will allow me to do no more, than barely to express my hearty assent to the truth of the proposition. It becomes not any one, lightly to introduce a Character of that Magnitude into discussions of this kind.

It becomes you, Gentlemen, to be cautious how you appear to be the advisers of injustice and hardship upon the *Old Soldier*. Such a conduct will shock the feelings of a “ Nation “ grateful to those who defend it.”

To have advised a Prince, who is truly the Soldier’s Friend, to neglect the merit of those, who have served Him and his illustrious House long and faithfully, will not be acceptable to such a Nation. But to have advised him to *distrust* them, to have put the defence of the Country and its Constitution into *new* hands, may perhaps one day raise sensations in the People of this Country, that may be formidable even to you.

You

(41)

You are great, powerful, and immoveable in your situations at present. Use your power with moderation, and with prudence; and remember, that many of the Political Revolutions in this Country have happened to Ministers, at the time when they were perhaps, in their own opinion, and in that of the world, the most secure.

T H E E N D.

